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Salary History and the Equal Pay Act: An
Argument for the Adoption of “Reckless
Discrimination” as a Theory of Liability
Kate Vandenberg
ABSTRACT
The Equal Pay Act (EPA) purports to prohibit employers from paying female
employees less than male employees with similar qualifications; however, the affirmative
defenses provided in the EPA are loopholes that perpetuate the gender pay gap. In
particular, the fourth affirmative defense allows for wage differentials based on a “factor
other than sex.” Many federal circuits have read this defense broadly to include wage
differentials based on salary history. That is, an employer can pay a female employee less
than her male counterparts because she was paid less by her previous employer. While
salary history was once viewed as an objective data point for wage setting, research now
demonstrates that reliance on salary history merely continues the gender discrimination of
previous employers.
This Note proposes that a model of recklessness in employment law should be applied
to the EPA to cover employers who continue to use salary history to determine new hire
salaries. Applying tort concepts, a plaintiff would show that the use of salary history is a
gendered employment practice by satisfying two elements: first, her employer knew or
should have known that using salary history carries the risk of perpetuating
discrimination; second, her employer’s burden to reduce the risk of perpetuating
discrimination was slight. This model allows a plaintiff to utilize an evolving understanding
of gendered employment practices that perpetuate the pay gap in order to undermine the
“factor other than sex” loophole in the EPA.
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963 with the hope of eliminating the
pay disparity between men and women.1 The EPA prohibits an employer from paying an
employee less than her peers on the basis of sex.2 However, under the EPA, an employer
can rely on a variety of affirmative defenses against a wage differential, including that the
differential is based on any factor other than sex.3 The “factor other than sex” defense is a
broad loophole exploited by employers, and the circuit courts disagree on the extent to
which employers can frame reliance on an employee’s salary history as a “factor other

1

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(2016).
3
Id.
2
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than sex.”4 Nobody knows better than Ailene Rizo just how far the United States must go
to fully close the gender pay gap because of this “factor other than sex” defense.5
Rizo was hired as a math consultant for the Fresno County School District and
subsequently learned that her peers, all of whom were male, were paid a higher salary.6
The County used a hiring schedule consisting of ten stepped salary levels.7 Rizo holds a
number of degrees, including a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics Education, a
Master’s Degree in Educational Technology, and a Master’s Degree in Mathematics
Education.8 Rizo had taught math, served as the head of a math department, and was a
math curriculum designer at a private company before applying to the school district.9
Despite these qualifications, she was placed at step 1 of level 1 of the hiring schedule,
whereas her male peers with similar qualifications were placed at higher levels.10
After the Fresno County School Board refused to fix the salary disparity, Rizzo
brought a claim under the EPA and other discrimination statutes.11 The county school
board did not deny paying Rizo less than her male counterparts. Instead, it raised the
affirmative defense that the wage differential was due to a factor “other than sex” because
they used her prior salary to determine where to start her on a salary schedule.12 The
district court denied summary judgment to the county, reasoning that “a pay structure
based exclusively on prior wages is so inherently fraught with the risk. . . that it will
perpetuate a discriminatory wage disparity between men and women that it cannot
stand”.13
The Ninth Circuit initially vacated the District Court’s decision, but later upheld the
decision after rehearing the case en banc.14 The Ninth Circuit overturned precedent from
1982 that allowed employers to use the new hire’s salary history as a “factor other than
sex” if that employer could show a legitimate business reason for doing so in new hire
salary determinations.15 The en banc panel reasoned that:
The Equal Pay Act stands for a principle as simple as it is just: men and
women should receive equal pay for equal work regardless of sex. The
question before us is also simple: can an employer justify a wage
differential between male and female employees by relying on prior

4

See infra Part IV.
Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 456–57 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d en banc, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019).
6
Rizo v. Yovino, No. 1:14-cv-0423-MJS, 2015 WL 9260587, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2015).
7
Rizo, 887 F.3d at 457.
8
Rizo, No. 1:14-cv-0423-MJS at *3.
9
Id.
10
Id. at *3–4. At the time, Rizo worked with three other math consultants: Eric Crantz, Mike Chamberlain,
and Carl Veater. While Rizo started on salary step 1, both Chamberlain and Veater began on step 7, and
Crantz started at step 9. Id. at *17.
11
Id. at *1.
12
Id. at *7.
13
Id. at *10.
14
Rizo, 887 F.3d at 468.
15
See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff represented a class of all
female agents working at Allstate who claimed that the use of salary history led to a wage differential on
the basis of sex. The Ninth Circuit held that the use of salary history did not constitute a discriminatory
wage setting practice.
5
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salary? Based on the text, history, and purpose of the Equal Pay Act, the
answer is clear: No.16
The defendant in the Ninth Circuit case petitioned for certiorari on September 4,
2018. Instead of reviewing the case on the merits, the Supreme Court ruled on a
procedural issue, thus vacating and remanding the case without addressing salary history
and the school board’s affirmative defense.18 In 1992, the Supreme Court denied a
petition for certiorari for another EPA case addressing whether the “factor other than sex”
defense must be supported by a legitimate business reason.19 It continues to remain
uncertain as to when the Court will decide to address the “factor other than sex” defense.
This Ninth Circuit opinion adds a new perspective to an existing circuit split on
whether prior salary can be considered a “factor other than sex ” in response to an EPA
claim.20 The “factor other than sex” affirmative defense is one of four available to
employers under the EPA framework. If the Supreme Court eventually addresses the use
of salary history in EPA defenses, it should uphold the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that salary
history is gendered and therefore cannot be used as an affirmative defense.
A Supreme Court holding that salary history cannot be used as part of the “factor
other than sex” affirmative defense to an EPA claim would be an important first step
towards closing the gender pay gap. But the EPA can and should go further to protect
plaintiffs. Moving forward, courts should treat an employer’s reliance on salary history as
sufficient evidence of a gendered wage differential. Courts could do so under the model
of reckless discrimination, a theory of liability that borrows principles from tort law.
This Note will first address the history of pay equity in the United States. It will
also address the current gender pay gap and efforts by states and local governments to
address the use of salary history in new hire wage setting. Next, this Note will explore the
current federal circuit split on the issue of salary history qualifying as a “factor other than
sex” and explain why the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to recognize salary history as a “factor
other than sex” is the correct interpretation of this fourth affirmative defense. Further, the
Note will argue that reliance on salary history undermines the purpose of the EPA and
therefore should not be used to establish an affirmative defense for employers. To the
contrary, the Note will conclude, an employer’s reliance on an employee’s prior salary
history constitutes reckless discrimination.
17

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Equal Pay Act and Pay Equity in the United States
The need to prohibit gender-based wage discrimination arose after women entered
the workplace to replace male employees who left to fight in the world wars.21 As of
16

Rizo, 887 F.3d at 456.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706 (No. 18-272) (Aug. 30, 2018).
18
Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 710 (2019).
19
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 965, 965 (1992).
20
See infra Part III.
21
Charlotte Alter, Here’s the History of the Battle for Equal Pay for American Women, TIME (Apr. 14,
2015), https://time.com/3774661/equal-pay-history/.
17
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1963, on average, women made 58.9 cents on every dollar a man made.22 However,
somewhat ironically, advocacy supporting the EPA centered around a concern that men’s
wages would decrease because businesses had the option of cheaper female labor.23
Despite these wartime concerns, legislation addressing pay equality was not introduced
until 1963,24 when Congress enacted the EPA to address the persistent pay disparity
between men and women.25
During Congress’s debate over the EPA, Democratic Senator Philip A. Hart, in
support of pay equity, articulated the underlying values behind the EPA:
Justice and fair play [sic] speak so eloquently [on] behalf of the equal pay
for women bill that it seems unnecessary to belabor the point. We can only
marvel that it has taken us so long to recognize the fact that equity and
economic soundness support this legislation.26
The mandate of the statute is simple: Employers cannot pay men and women
differently for the same work.27 If employers are found liable under the EPA, they can
assert one of four affirmative defenses: employers may argue that the wage disparity
between male and female workers is justified if it was made pursuant to: “(i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”28
Numerous legal scholars have criticized the “factor other than sex” defense as a
broad loophole for businesses seeking to continue discriminatory practices or to benefit
from the financial savings from the wage differential.29 As discussed in greater detail
Katherine Gallagher Robbins & Abby Lane, The Wage Gap over Time, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (May 3,
2012), https://nwlc.org/blog/wage-gap-over-time/. The gap was even greater for women of color. For
example, in 1967, Black women made only 43.2 cents for each dollar a white man earned. Id.
23
Robbins, supra note 22; Alter, supra note 21.
24
Alter, supra note 21.
25
Robbins, supra note 22.
26
109 CONG. REC. 8916 (1963) (statement of Sen. Hart).
27
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2016). The relevant portion of the text is as follows:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this part shall discriminate,
within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment
for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based
on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate
differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the
provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
28
Id.
29
Carole Supowitz Katz, Wage Discrimination Claims: Employee’s Prior Salary Fails The ‘Factor Other
Than Sex’ Test, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 225–26 (1984). See, e.g., Peter Avery, The Diluted
Equal Pay Act: How Was It Broken? How Can It Be Fixed?, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 863–71 (2004). See
generally Jeanne M. Hamburg, When Prior Pay Isn’t Equal Pay: A Proposed Standard for the
Identification of “Factors Other Than Sex” Under the Equal Pay Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1989);
Jeffrey K. Brown, Crossing the Line: The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ Misapplication of
the Equal Pay Act’s “Any Other Factor Other Than Sex” Defense, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 181 (1995).
22
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below, the federal circuits are split on how to address the “factor other than sex”
defense.30
Although the EPA has been in force for fifty-five years, the gender pay gap has not
closed.31 Today, women make only 80.5 cents on every dollar earned by men in the
United States.32 Certain states, localities, and territories of the United States have targeted
salary history as a source of the perpetuation of the gender pay gap.33 The following
subpart will discuss state and local legislation addressing salary history in wage-setting.
B. State and Local Legislation Addressing Salary History
As of 2019, twenty localities, sixteen states and Puerto Rico have passed legislation
or executive orders prohibiting the use of salary history in wage setting practices.34 These
laws vary in scope, both in terms of the types of employers covered and the restrictions
that apply to those covered employers.
Some states—such as California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Oregon, and Vermont and Puerto Rico—have passed laws that prohibit all employers,
private and public, from seeking prior salary information.35 Two counties (Albany
County, NY and Westchester County, NY) and two cities (New York City and San
Francisco) passed similar ordinances.36 In states such as California, Hawaii, and Oregon,
as well as at the local level in San Francisco and New York City, employers are barred
from relying on an employee’s prior salary to determine what salary to offer, even if the
employer discovers that information without solicitation.37 Additionally, employers in
San Francisco are prohibited from disclosing prior salary even if such information is
solicited by companies seeking to hire a former employee.38 In Massachusetts, employers

30

See infra Part III.
INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, PAY EQUITY & DISCRIMINATION (2018),
https://iwpr.org/issue/employment-education-economic-change/pay-equity-discrimination/.
32
Id. The pay gap is even greater for women belonging to other protected classes. For example, Black
women only earn 65 cents for every dollar a man makes. Id. Women with disabilities earn just over 52
cents for every dollar a man without a disability makes. NATIONAL WOMEN’S RESOURCE LAW CENTER,
THE WAGE GAP: THE WHO, HOW, WHY AND WHAT TO DO (2019), https://nwlc.org/resources/the-wagegap-the-who-how-why-and-what-to-do/.
33
Salary History Bans: A Running List of States and Localities That Have Outlawed Pay History
Questions, HUMAN RESOURCES DRIVE (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.hrdive.com/news/salary-history-banstates-list/516662/ (last updated Dec. 6, 2019).
34
Id.
35
CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (Deering 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-8 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
709B (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.4 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(b) (2018); OR. REV.
STAT. § 652.220 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495m (2017); P.R. LAWS ANN. (2017).
36
S.F, CAL. POLICE & ADMINISTRATIVE CODES, No. 142-17 (2017); Committee on Civil Rights, 2017/067
(2017), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2813507&GUID=938399E5-660842F5-9C83-9D2665D9496F&Options=&Search; Albany County, NY Local Law no. P for 2016;
Westchester County, NY Resolution No. 28-2018 (2018).
37
CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (Deering 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 2351-1 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 652. 220
(2017); S.F., CAL. POLICE & ADMINISTRATIVE CODES, No. 142-17 (2017); Committee on Civil Rights,
2017/067 (2017), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2813507&GUID=938399E56608-42F5-9C83-9D2665D9496F&Options=&Search.
38
CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3; HAW. REV. STAT. § 2351-1 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.230 (2017); S.F.,
CAL., POLICE & ADMINISTRATIVE CODES, No. 142-17 (2017); Committee on Civil Rights, 2017/067
31
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are not allowed to use salary history as a defense to a state claim of a gendered wage
disparity, even if the candidate offered that information to the potential employer without
solicitation.39
Other states and localities have enacted legislation that only covers public
employees. Five municipalities—Chicago, IL; Louisville Jefferson County, KY; New
Orleans, LA; Kansas City, MO; and Pittsburgh, PA—forbid public employers from
asking about salary history but have not extended that prohibition to the private sector.40
In Pittsburgh, however, public employers may rely on prior salary to set present wages so
long as the candidate offers the information unprompted.41 The New York State
legislature has not yet passed a ban on inquiring about salary history.42 However, in 2017
Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York State imposed restrictions on state agencies
through an executive order.43 Similar executive orders have been imposed by Governor
Tom Wolf of Pennsylvania and Governor Philip D. Murphy of New Jersey in 2018.44
Although it was poised to be the first city to ban asking about salary history,45
Philadelphia’s salary history ban46 on both public and private employers is currently
being challenged in court.47 In April 2018, Judge Goldberg of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted a preliminary injunction against the ban on asking about salary
history, holding that the ordinance violated the First Amendment.48 However, he did not
grant an injunction against the prohibition against relying on prior salary to determine
present wages.49 The city has not yet appealed this decision.50
In contrast, some states have taken a pro-employer stance on the use of salary
history. Michigan and Wisconsin both passed legislation prohibiting localities from
instituting salary history bans.51 The language of the Wisconsin statute is illustrative of
the mindset behind these prohibitions. The act sought to protect “the employer’s right to
solicit salary information of prospective employees”52 taking a pro-business stance on the
(2017), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2813507&GUID=938399E5-660842F5-9C83-9D2665D9496F&Options=&Search.
39
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(b) (2018).
40
Chi., Ill., Exec. Order No. 2018-1 (2018); Louisville, Ky., Ordinance No. 066 (2018); New Orleans, La.,
Exec. Order MLJ 17-01 (2017); Kansas City, Mo., Resolution No. 180519 (2018); Pittsburgh, Pa.,
Ordinance No. 2017-1121 (2017).
41
Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 2017-1121 (2017).
42
Chris Chrisbens, New York State’s Latest Push to Broaden Salary History Ban, PAY EQUITY ADVISOR
BLOG (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.payequityadvisor.com/2018/04/new-york-states-latest-push-to-broadensalary-history-ban/.
43
Governor of the State of New York, Exec. Order No. 161 (2017).
44
Governor of the State of Pennsylvania, Exec. Order No. 2018-18-03 (2018); Governor of the State of
New Jersey, Exec. Order No. 1 (2018).
45
Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Philadelphia Becomes First US City to Ban Pay History Questions, HUMAN
RESOURCES DRIVE (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/philadelphia-becomes-first-us-city-toban-pay-history-questions/435894/.
46
Philadelphia, Pa., Wage Equity Ordinance No. 7.4 (2017).
47
Kathryn Moody, Philadelphia’s Salary History Ban Violates First Amendment, Judge Says, HUMAN
RESOURCES DRIVE (May 2, 2018), https://www.hrdive.com/news/philadelphias-salary-history-ban-violatesfirst-amendment-judge-says/522569/.
48
Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., 319 F. Supp. 3d 773, 812 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
49
Id.
50
Moody, supra note 47.
51
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 123.1384 (Lexis 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.36 (West 2018).
52
Id. at § 103.36 (2018).
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question of reliance on salary history. These statutes suggest that the Michigan and
Wisconsin state legislatures worry that localities will unnecessarily interfere with the
business in their state.53
While certain states, territories, and localities have made steps towards prohibiting
the use of and reliance on salary history in new hire wage determinations, actions in
states such as Michigan and Wisconsin, as well as Philadelphia’s salary history ban, show
that it is necessary to abolish the use of salary history by closing loopholes in federal
legislation. As discussed later in this Note, the EPA already prohibits the use of salary
history to justify a wage differential.54 The problem lies not with the EPA, but rather with
many circuits’ interpretations that allow salary history to constitute the fourth affirmative
defense.
II. SALARY HISTORY – AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OR GENDERED?
The circuit courts take varying approaches to the salary history affirmative defense.
Some circuits allow salary history to be the sole “factor other than sex,” while other
circuits allow the use of salary history as a justification so long as it is paired with other
considerations.55 The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rizzo v. Yovino makes that Circuit the
outlier, as it is the only Circuit that outright prohibits the use of salary history as the
fourth affirmative defense.56
A. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits: Employers Can Defend with Salary
History Alone
The decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits view the “factor other than sex”
defense the most broadly, and therefore the most employer-friendly. Both Circuits allow
a defendant’s reliance on prior salary, without more, to qualify as the fourth affirmative
defense.57
In Wernsing v. Department of Human Services, the Seventh Circuit held that prior
salary is a legitimate “factor other than sex” that may stand on its own without requiring
additional justification for the wage differential.58 The plaintiff, Wernsing, was hired in
the Office of the Inspector General in the Department of Human Services in Illinois
(Department) as an internal security investigator.59 Wernsing entered the Department
from the private sector, where her total salary was significantly less than the lowest salary
offered in the Department.60 Upon her hiring, the Department started her at a monthly pay

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.36 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 123.1384. “A local governmental
body shall not adopt, enforce, or administer an ordinance, local policy, or local resolution regulating
information an employer or potential employer must … exclude on an application.” Id.
54
See infra Part IV.
55
See infra Part III, subparts i-iii.
56
See infra Part II.
57
Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 2003); Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F. 3d 466,
468 (7th Cir. 2005).
58
Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 468.
59
Id. at 467.
60
Id.
53
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rate of $2,478. This figure represented an almost 30% pay increase from what she was
making in the private sector.61
If the facts ended there, Wernsing would seem to have been treated very well at the
Department. However, male employees in substantially similar roles to her earned
significantly more than Wernsing.62 For example, one male employee in a similar role
commenced his employment with the Department at a monthly salary of $3,739.63 Based
on these facts, Wernsing had a prima facie case for wage discrimination, but the
Department escaped liability by raising the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense.64
Wernsing argued that “because women earn less than men from private
employment, all market wages must be discriminatory and therefore must be ignored
when setting salaries.”65 The Seventh Circuit accepted her argument empirically but
attributed the statistics to a difference in experience, which the court held was not an
inherently discriminatory motive to pay the individuals differently.66 It argued that
because women take time out of the workplace to rear children, they have less
employment experience than men, which justified the compensation differential.67 The
court reasoned that “[w]ages rise with experience as well as with other aspects of human
capital.”68
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning ultimately undermines its holding. Even if we
concede that the gender pay gap is caused exclusively by maternity leave, the resulting
pay differential is inherently gendered by the fact that only women get pregnant. As such,
the Seventh Circuit erred in allowing salary history to be used as a “factor other than
sex.”69 Alternatively, if the Seventh Circuit is implying that an experience differential
results in a pay differential, then the court could have (and should have) required the
Department to show a difference in the level of experience that Wernsing held compared
with her male counterparts. A gap in experience would have been a legitimate,
ungendered justification for the wage differential.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has treated the fourth affirmative defense as a “catchall” for any excuse an employer could create to explain a wage gap between men and
women.70 In Taylor v. White, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that a
reliance on prior salary perpetuates the gender pay gap because she failed to show that
the reliance was gendered.71 The plaintiff, Taylor, worked as a civilian employee at the
Army’s Arkansas Arsenal (the Arsenal).72 She and three other employees, one female and
two males, transferred to a different program where all of the individuals “shared a lack
Id. Both the plaintiff and her male counterparts held the title “Internal Security Investigator II.” Brief for
Appellant-Petitioner at *9, Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F. 3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005) (No. 042225), 2005 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 160.
62
Wernsing, 427 F. 3d at 467.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 471.
65
Id. at 470.
66
Id.
67
Id. “That many women spend more years in child-rearing than do men thus implies that women’s market
wages will be lower on average.” Id.
68
Id.
69
See id. at 468–70.
70
Taylor, 321 F.3d at 715.
71
Id. at 720–21.
72
Id. at 712.
61
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of relevant experience and training” when they first began the program.73 Despite this,
Taylor and the other female employee began the program at a lower salary than their
male counterpart.74
In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit cautioned that an employer should not justify
paying women less simply because the market does so.75 It was also wary about the
plaintiff’s prior salary being used to perpetuate lower wages because that would risk
perpetuating the gender pay gap.76 Nevertheless, the court still upheld the use of salary
history as a “factor other than sex” because, while the wage differential was suspect, the
Eighth Circuit did not find that the employer’s actions rose “above the level of merely
suspicious.”77 Just like the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit conceded that reliance on
prior salary runs a risk of perpetuating the gender pay gap.78 However, both Circuits have
allowed salary history to be interpreted as a gender-neutral affirmative defense in
subsequent cases.79 These Circuits have failed to uphold the purpose of the EPA by
allowing a gendered practice to set new hire wages.
B. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits: Salary History as One Element of the
Affirmative Defense
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have taken a relatively more employee-friendly
approach, allowing consideration of salary history only when it is not the sole
justification for a wage disparity.80 However, these Circuits’ reasoning still demonstrates
an unsatisfactory approach to the fourth affirmative defense.
In Irby v. Bittick, the plaintiff began working as an undercover agent for the county
sheriff before moving to other divisions within the police force.81 Eventually, she was the
only female investigator in the criminal investigations division.82 Irby later discovered
that the division paid her less than her male colleagues, despite doing substantially the
same work.83
The Eleventh Circuit accepted the defendant’s affirmative “factor other than sex”
defense because the employer set the male employees’ salaries higher after considering
both salary history and experience.84 To the court, the combination of factors justified the
wage disparity between men and women.85
However, in its reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit laid out the standard that
“defendants must how that the factor of sex provided no basis for the wage
73

Id. at 713.
Id.
75
Id. at 718.
76
Id. at 718–19.
77
Id. at 722. The court held that “no reasonable finder of fact could reject the undisputed evidence
concerning the actual employees in this case and the benefits received by those employees.” Id. at 723.
78
Id.
79
Lauderdale v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2017); Drum v. Leeson Elec.
Corp., 565 F.3d 1071, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 2009).
80
Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015); Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d
1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988).
81
Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1995).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 955.
85
Id. at 959.
74

254

Vol. 15:2]

Kate Vandenberg

differential.”86 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit previously held that prior salary alone
cannot qualify as a factor other than sex.87 If salary history does not qualify as a “factor
other than sex,” then it is illogical to allow defendant employers to use salary history at
all, even with other rationales, when raising the fourth affirmative defense.
Similarly, employers in the Tenth Circuit are required to bundle prior salary
information with other factors to satisfy the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense in
a wage disparity case.88 In Mickelson v. New York Life Insurance Company, the plaintiff
was hired at an insurance company but earned a significantly lower starting salary than
her male colleagues, despite her professional experience and a law degree.89 When she
inquired about this wage disparity, she was told that the company sets salaries by
weighing experience, qualifications, market factors, and salary history.90 However, the
plaintiff did not find these rationales believable, as she had more experience than her
male colleague who made a higher salary.91 Unsatisfied with her employer’s explanation,
she continued to complain to individuals higher up on the supervisory chain, which
eventually led to alleged retaliatory adverse employment actions.92
For context, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the premise that while prior salary alone
cannot justify a wage disparity between the sexes, it can be used in conjunction with
other rationales to function as an affirmative defense under the EPA.93 However, the
court failed to rationalize why salary history information alone would not justify a pay
differential, inferring that without more, the employer may be found to have
discriminated against the employee.94 As with the flawed reasoning of the Eleventh
Circuit, it is not logical to prohibit a practice in isolation because it is discriminatory
against one gender, but then conversely hold that the same practice is not discriminatory
on the basis of gender when it is paired with other factors. A gendered rationale is
illegitimate regardless if it is paired with another factor or justified by a legitimate
business rationale.95
C. The Second and Sixth Circuits: Salary History as a Legitimate Business Purpose
The Second and Sixth Circuits take a more moderate approach than the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits by requiring the “factor other than sex” defense to be supported by a
legitimate business purpose,96 similar to the Ninth Circuit’s abandoned reasoning in
Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.97 While the issue of salary history and the fourth
affirmative defense has not been explicitly addressed by these Circuits, their rationales
behind similar applications of the defense can be used to anticipate how they might
86
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approach salary history in future cases, assuming the Supreme Court does not rule on this
issue.
In Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. School Dist., the plaintiff worked for a school district
under the title of “cleaner,” and earned less than her coworkers who were classified as
“custodians.”98 All of the cleaners for the school district were women, and all of the
custodians were men.99 The school district argued that the pay differential was not
because of the different genders of the two jobs, but was caused instead by the
classification system applied to the two roles.100 However, the Second Circuit held that
“an employer bears the burden of proving that a bona fide business-related reason exists
for using the gender-neutral factor . . . in order to establish the factor-other-than-sex
defense.”101 Because the school district could not provide a legitimate reason for the
classification system, the court did not allow it to be used as a “factor other than sex”
defense.102 However, this suggests that the Second Circuit would be willing to allow
policies that overtly implicate gender, as the classification in Aldrich did, so long as those
policies have an underlying business rationale, although this has not yet been definitively
applied.
The Sixth Circuit similarly limits the fourth affirmative defense, holding that the
“‘factor other than sex’ defense does not include literally any other factor, but a factor
that, at a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate business reason.”103 For example, in a
suit arguing a violation of the EPA, the plaintiff in Beck-Wilson v. Principi established a
question of fact for the jury when she demonstrated that her that her job as nurse
practitioner, which was predominantly occupied by female employees, could be viewed
as substantially similar to the role of physician assistant, a job predominantly filled by
male employees.104 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded the claim, reasoning that a
reasonable factfinder could have found the employer’s rationale for different pay scales
for the two positions to be illegitimate, or, in other words, a pretext for discrimination.105
The court therefore held that summary judgment for the employer was in error, and the
case was remanded.106 However, the Sixth Circuit was not inherently hostile towards the
use of different pay scales; it simply required that the employer produce a legitimate
business justification for its practice.107
In light of these decisions, it is likely that both the Second and Sixth Circuits would
welcome the presentation of prior salary history information as a basis to support the
fourth affirmative defense so long as employers have a legitimate business reason for
relying on prior salary information. However, as discussed later in this Note,108
businesses have ample resources for determining a new hire’s wage, which do not rely on
a potentially discriminatory metric. Therefore, reliance on prior salary cannot be a
98
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legitimate business practice, as there are alternatives that do not carry the risk of liability
under the EPA.109
In County of Washington v. Gunther, the Supreme Court held that the application of
the EPA is confined to “the act of wage differentials attributable to sex
discrimination,”110 allowing employers to defend against a claim with a bona fide use of
the “factor other than sex” defense. In the following part, this Note will show why the
reliance on salary history to determine present wages is not a bona fide “factor other than
sex” and will argue that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rizo v. Yovino111 is thus consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.
III. RECKLESSNESS IN EMPLOYMENT
Professor Stephanie Bornstein articulated a model of “reckless discrimination”
under Title VII, whereby an employer’s reckless disregard for biased employment
practices can establish a Title VII discrimination claim.112 Title VII bans discrimination
based on protected classes, including race and gender.113 Under Bornstein’s model,
plaintiffs would be allowed to bring a claim for an employer’s reckless disregard for
biased employment practices under Title VII.114 Based on the circuits’ inconsistent
holdings on the use of salary history as a factor other than sex, this author proposes that a
model of recklessness in employment law should be applied to the EPA to cover
employers who continue to use salary history to determine new hire salaries.
A. Bornstein and Title VII
In her 2017 article titled Reckless Discrimination, Bornstein was the first to
articulate a model of reckless discrimination that applied to Title VII claims.115 Bornstein
argued that the modeling of discrimination law after tort law is appropriate given recent
Supreme Court decisions.116 Specifically, the Roberts Court decided three cases between
2009 and 2013 that applied tort concepts, particularly causation and proximate cause, to
discrimination cases.117 In one case, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, directly
acknowledged the incorporation of “the traditional tort-law concept of proximate cause”
into the opinion.118
Some scholars have expressed concern about the “tortification” of discrimination
law, fearing that but-for causation and proximate cause are high bars for a plaintiff to
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meet in discrimination cases.119 These scholars argue that discrimination law requires
only that a plaintiff’s protected class be a motivating factor in the adverse action, a lower
bar than what tort law requires.120
However, recent Supreme Court precedent applies tort concepts to discrimination
claims, and moving forward, plaintiffs will need to meet the standards laid out by the
Court, even if the bar was raised by the application of tort concepts.121 For example, in
Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Court adopted the tort law concept of proximate cause,
holding that the plaintiff’s protected class need only be a motivating factor in the
employer’s discriminatory employment action.122 In University of Texas Southwest
Medical Center v. Nassar, the Court went so far as to describe the “but for” causation
standard used in that case as “textbook tort law” that was the “background against which
Congress legislated in enacting Title VII.”123 Bornstein’s application of tort law concepts
to discrimination law thus extends the Roberts Court’s understanding of Title VII.
Under Bornstein’s model of reckless discrimination, plaintiffs must show two
elements of recklessness in their employer’s practices to establish a Title VII claim. First,
plaintiffs must show that the employer knew or should have known of the risk of
perpetuating discrimination by using the specific employment practice at issue.124
Second, the plaintiff needs to show that the employer’s burden to reduce the risk of the
employment practice perpetuating discrimination was slight, demonstrating the
employer’s “indifference to the risk.”125 These elements are modeled after the
Restatement (Third) of Torts.126
Bornstein applies this framework to workplace policies and practices, particularly
those dealing with hiring and promotion, to provide employees with a new cause of
action under Title VII.127 Under the model, a Title VII plaintiff would point to social
science data that demonstrate the extent to which stereotypes and biases infiltrate the
workforce and affect employment decision-making.128 Additionally, a plaintiff would
also need to point to the prevalence of implicit bias in “mainstream lexicon” as providing
the employer with adequate notice.129 For example, an employee who seeks to show that
he was passed on for a promotion could point to studies that show that men of color are
less likely to be promoted than white men; he would then have to show that this is a
119
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problem that is often covered in implicit bias trainings and other human resource
department materials. These developments fulfill the first element of reckless
discrimination, as this would show that the employer knows or should know that biases
and stereotypes may result in discrimination against protected groups.130
Second, the plaintiff would need to show that other employers within the plaintiff’s
industry have voluntarily and successfully taken steps to reduce bias in their
workforce.131 For example, many employers have diversified their recruitment processes,
created diversity initiatives, established protocols and policies to reduce harassment, and
monitored the effects their practices have on the diversity of their workforce.132
Technology has also created the ability for employers to conduct blind screenings
of applicants.133 This prevents implicit biases of the hiring committee to unfairly
disadvantage certain candidates. Not only are these best practices only minimally
burdensome, but they have been shown to be ultimately profitable for employers by
establishing a reputation of progressive anti-discrimination policies.134 A failure to
engage in these best practices allows for the inference that the employer is indifferent to
the risk that its practices are discriminatory. By satisfying these two elements, the
plaintiff would adequately state a claim for reckless discrimination under Title VII.
B. Applicability to the Equal Pay Act
Given the recent developments in the Roberts Court, it is “doctrinally incoherent
for the Court to fail to extend tort concepts to Title VII.”135 Similarly, it would be
incoherent to fail to extend the concept of recklessness to the EPA, especially given the
fact that many courts treat the EPA and Title VII interchangeably in discrimination
jurisprudence.136
If adopted, the reckless discrimination model could correct the circuit split on
whether prior pay history qualifies as a “factor other than sex.” Not only would the model
of reckless discrimination undermine an employer’s affirmative defense, but it would
function as proof of liability for a discriminatory wage differential under the EPA. For
example, after an EPA plaintiff establishes that there is a pay differential along gender
lines, the defendant employer may raise the “factor other than sex” defense by arguing
that it relied on the plaintiff’s prior salary to set her new salary.137 The plaintiff could
then attempt to undermine that affirmative defense through the model of reckless
discrimination, as described below. Not only would this model show that reliance on
prior salary is not a “factor other than sex,” but it would lend weight to the plaintiff’s
claim that the pay differential she suffered was, in fact, “on the basis of sex.”138
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In order to use the reckless discrimination model to show that the use of salary
history is a gendered employment practice, not a “factor other than sex,” the plaintiff
would first need to show that the employer knew or should have known that using salary
history carries the risk of perpetuating discrimination.139 First and foremost, the gender
pay gap is well-documented.140 Not only do human resource departments have access to a
vast amount of research on the pay gap, but the gender pay gap is also well-publicized
through Equal Pay Day (as well as other Pay Days for intersectional identities)141 and the
passage of state and local regulations banning employers from asking about prior
salary.142 Furthermore, organizations like the Society for Human Resource Management
encourage their members to forgo reliance on salary history in favor of setting present
salary based on other factors such as market data and objective qualifications.143 Given
the prevalence of this information in both the human resource space and in the news more
broadly, it is reasonable to expect employers to know that relying on salary history to
determine present wages carries the risk of perpetuating discrimination. Employers would
be unable to rebut the presumption by claiming that they did not have actual or
constructive knowledge of these best practices, given the wide coverage of these best
practices.
In defense, employers may argue that the issue of adequate notice is foreclosed by
the current precedent in the circuit courts.144 However, this proposed framework allows
for evolving standards in human resources and shifts in social science to bolster the
plaintiff’s claims in light of negative precedent. Recklessness in employment practices
looked different when the Ninth Circuit decided Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. in
1982.145 In the thirty-six years since that case, employers (and courts) have learned a
great deal more about implicit bias, diversity in the workplace, and the gender pay gap, as
evidenced by the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rizo.146 While this Note discusses
recklessness in wage-setting generally, the court should engage in a fact-intensive
inquiry; therefore, what an employer should have known in 1982 will look different than
what an employer should have known today. Thus, existing circuit court precedent does
not undermine the notice requirement.
139
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The second element of reckless discrimination requires an evaluation of the burden
on employers to avoid the risk of discrimination.147 State and local laws that prohibit
employers from inquiring about prior salary imply that there are other ways that public
and private employers alike can determine a new hire’s salary.148 Additionally, human
resource departments and organizations have long used other methods to establish a
starting salary,149 including: evaluating the new hire’s qualifications and experiences
against current employees; conducting market research that considers comparable
positions beyond job title; updating salary schedules regularly; and considering the
requirements of a position holistically, as opposed to relying solely on the job title.150
The ability to avoid the risk by using other wage-setting practices may depend on
the employer’s industry or the size of the company, and this second element requires a
fact-intensive inquiry. However, given the multitude of alternatives available to
employers and human resource departments to avoid the risk of perpetuating wage
discrimination, it is likely that the failure to avoid using prior salary to set present wages
would constitute an “indifference to the risk” of perpetuating pay discrimination.151
If the Supreme Court eventually addresses the fourth affirmative defense as used in
Rizo, it should categorize salary history as inherently gendered. Thus, rather than
functioning as an affirmative defense, proof of an employer’s reliance on prior salary
would instead prove employer liability under the EPA.
C. Counterarguments
Proponents for the use of prior salary information to determine new hire wages may
argue that the EPA does not require employers to completely close the gender pay gap.152
However, the EPA does forbid employers from engaging in practices that amount to pay
discrimination, even if employers are not tasked with eliminating all societal
contributions to the gender pay gap. Employers are responsible for their policies and
practices. The reckless discrimination framework holds employers accountable for
adopting and maintaining policies that may perpetuate pay discrimination. This
framework does not impose additional responsibilities on businesses to fix society at
large; it does, however, require employers to clean up their own shops by ending the
recklessly discriminatory practice of relying on salary history.
Furthermore, a Amici Curiae Brief by the Center for Workplace Compliance and
National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center prepared for
the Rizo petition for writ of certiorari argues that the gender wage gap cannot be pinned
147
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on any one cause; it argues that blaming the gap on salary history alone is unfounded and
unnecessary.153 The brief points to a 2009 study that identified a number of factors, such
as women having to pause their careers when they become pregnant and different choices
in occupation along gender lines, that could also explain the persistence of the gender pay
gap.154 This Note makes no assertions about the cause of the gender pay gap, only that
employers run the risk of perpetuating that gap by relying on salary history. Thus, factors
other than salary history can and should be used to set wages.
Relying on salary history does not allow employers to make an assessment of an
applicant’s potential contribution to the company. It merely uses a metric established by a
previous employer to set an employee’s salary despite both the risk of perpetuating the
gender pay gap and the availability of other tools to set wages. As an alternative,
employers can use an employee’s amount and quality of professional experience and
level of education to determine wages. Reliance on salary history carries a risk of
perpetuating a discriminatory wage differential, and employers should be liable if they do
not use best practices in their industry to determine a new hire’s salary.
Other scholars worry that forbidding employers from relying on salary history may
actually exacerbate the gender pay gap.155 They fear that without salary history
information, employers will instead rely on a practice called “statistical discrimination,”
an economic term for reliance on group averages in place of individualized
information.156 These scholars argue that in the absence of individualized information,
employers will make assumptions about a woman’s prior salary based on women’s
salaries in the aggregate, which would exacerbate the gender pay gap.157 This argument
conveniently ignores the fact that the EPA still holds employers liable for wage
differentials—even when they do not use salary history as an affirmative defense. If an
employer relies on statistical discrimination, rather than an employee’s prior salary, to
pay female employees less than male employees, the employer’s actions are nevertheless
prohibited by the EPA because these statistics are gendered on their face.
Alternatively, other scholars fear that the void of salary histories may leave women
to negotiate their salaries, which may disproportionately harm women.158 Studies show
that women tend to undervalue their economic worth to a company, a phenomenon called
entitlement theory, which leads to women negotiating for lower salaries, as well as
employers offering female candidates weaker compensation packages.159 Some scholars
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go so far as to advocate for the practice of negotiating salaries as failing to satisfy the as a
“factor other than sex” affirmative defense as well.160
As discussed above,161 employers have ample information that is independent from
prior salary information or from direct negotiation tactics that can be used to determine
present wages. However, it is important to note that the model of reckless discrimination
as applied to salary history does not seek to end all wage discrimination and close the
gender pay gap completely; that is a monumental task that will require a number of
private, local, state, and federal initiatives. This Note merely proposes to close one
loophole that has allowed employers to perpetuate discrimination without liability and
does not aim to tackle the problem of salary negotiations, although it is possible that the
reckless discrimination framework could be applied to other employment practices.
Finally, opponents to this framework may argue that the issue of reliance on salary
history should be resolved by Congress through the Paycheck Fairness Act (PFA) instead
of by the courts through the EPA.162 The PFA is a proposed bill that aims to address
shortcomings of the EPA and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.163 A cornerstone of this
bill is a provision that would explicitly narrow the “factor other than sex” affirmative
defense.164 In theory, the PFA seems like a sufficient remedy. However, it has failed to
pass time and time again,165 in no small part because many members of Congress worry
about limiting business discretion in employment practices.166 It could be argued that
Congress has also failed to narrow the scope of the “factor other than sex” defense;
however, Congressional action is unnecessary because social science research and
improvements in human resources departments’ best practices and policies already
narrow the scope of the affirmative defense.
While the PFA may be the future solution to many loopholes in pay equity
legislation, the EPA as currently written provides the necessary language for closing the
prior salary loophole found in the fourth affirmative defense. The EPA mandates that
“[n]o employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex.”167
Research demonstrates the gendered nature of salary history, and that improved
understanding should be used to reexamine interpretations of the EPA as written.
Furthermore, this is not a case of either/or, but rather an opportunity to get relief for
plaintiffs harmed by reliance on salary history using existing law while Congress works
towards larger systemic changes to close the gender pay gap.
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CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit correctly overturned its earlier line of cases that allowed salary
history to qualify as a “factor other than sex” in the fourth affirmative defense to an EPA
claim.168 As the Circuit explained, salary history is inherently gendered, and its use as an
affirmative defense undermines the goals of the EPA.169
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning adds to the growing understanding that reliance on
salary history perpetuates the gender pay gap. As evidenced by the actions taken by ten
states, nine local governments, and Puerto Rico to eliminate the reliance on prior history
to set new wages, many have accepted the premise that forbidding employers from
inquiring about prior salary can help close the gender pay gap. To that end, plaintiffs
should be able to co-opt this former affirmative defense and hold employers liable for
reckless discrimination. The framework for reckless discrimination does not rely on
outdated precedent, but instead looks to social science to address a persistent problem in
employment. Just as the Ninth Circuit and a number of state and local governments have
reconsidered their approach to salary history, plaintiffs should rethink how they frame
their wage differential claims under the Equal Pay Act.
If the Supreme Court has the opportunity to address the fourth affirmative defense
in an Equal Pay Act claim, the Court should view the reliance on salary history as a
gendered practice which does not qualify as a “factor other than sex” under the EPA. In
future cases, plaintiffs should argue that an employer’s reliance on prior salary is proof of
liability for a wage differential under the model of reckless discrimination. Closing the
“factor other than sex” loophole in the EPA is one necessary step, albeit small, towards
closing the gender pay gap.
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